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There is a strange relationship between public service and politics. Public
servants work within politics but there have always been attempts to keep
politics out of public service. Attempts have been made to keep politicians
removed from policy implementation and also beyond the direct control of the
employment relationship (ER) of public servants. Many argue that the series of
reforms that have recently swept the public service have led to the increased
control by politicians of the ER of public servants. Reforms to the Australian
public sec/or over the past decades began with the Royal Commission on
Australian Government Administration (RCAGA-the Coombs Commission).
This article examines the Coombs Recommendations to detennine whether its
proposed changes laid the basis for an increased direct control of the
employment arrangements of the senior public service by politicians. TIle
article concludes that although the Commission did not recommend a direct
control by politicians of the employment relationship of public servants, many of
its recommendations paved the way for increased control by recommending
changes thai would undermine the traditional independent relationship of
public servants. Allhough the Commission did not recommend politicisation of
senior public service employment, many of its recommendat ions paved the way
for such politicisation. These findings are important not only for an improved
understanding of the issues associated with public sector politicisation but also
for their implications for understanding the nature of control in the employment
relationship more generally. The findings of this article demonstrate how
seemingly minor changes to traditional employment arrangements can lead to
more profound alterations in the nalure of control and independence.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of the modern public service in the mid-
nineteenth century, concerted effort has been made to keep politicians
out of public management. Legal provisions have been introduced to
prevent interference of politicians in employment aspects of public
managers and also from the detail implementation of public policies.
One purpose of the introduction of this arrangement was to get rid of
the problems associated with the patronage system which many
claimed led to inefficiency and ineffective use of public money. The
reforms introduced to the Australian public sector in the last three
decades saw a gradual but steady increase in the role of politicians in
the employment relationship of senior public servants.
During the past thirty years or so, the Australian federal public
service has experienced fundamental changes (Colley, 2001; Spry, 2001;
Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), 2002; Pullin and Haidar,
2003). Many claim that these reforms have led to the increased political
control of the public service (Weller, 1989:369;Mulgan, 1998:3;Hawkes,
1999:80; Nethercote, 2003). The Royal Commission on Australian
Government Administration (RCAGA) chaired by H. C. (Nugget)
Coombs and known colloquially as the Coombs Commission has been
seen to significantly influence public sector reform in Australia for the
past three decades (Colebatch, 2002; Podger, 2004:2;Briggs, 2005). The
purpose of this article is to ascertain the position taken by the RCAGA
Report concerning politicians controlling the employment relationship
of senior public servants.
The article begins by establishing a framework for analysing the
political control of the employment relationship. The actual
Recommendations of the RCAGA, the academic and community
discussion of relevant issues contained in the report, other statements
made by Commissioners appointed to the RCAGA, and scholarly
reviews of the Commission findings are viewed to assess the position
of the Coombs Commission regarding political control of the
employment of senior public servants.
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Woodrow Wilson was one of the most articulate authorities on the
issue of the relationship between politics and public management. He
argued that politics should be out of public administration: 'The field of
administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and
strife of politics ... r (Wilson, 1953:71). When students of public
management separate politics from administration, they emphasise two
important aspects. First, politics is viewed as policy or strategy
formulation and administration is viewed as implementation. This is
the infamous policy-administration dichotomy model (Svara, 1998).
The second aspect focuses on removing politics from the employment
aspects of public servants. The purpose behind making such a
distinction is to remove politics from both the employment relationship
and from the actions of public servants. The underlying idea is to
create a public service independent of politics in the employment
relations and in the actions of public servants.
The focus of this article is on the control politicians have over the
employment relationship of senior public servants. The aim to create a
public service which is beyond the direct control of politicians has been
the subject of serious concern and scrutiny at least since the Northcote-
Trevelyan Report of 1853. Claims that politicians have enhanced their
control over the employment aspect of the Australian public service
have been increased since the 1970s (Henderson, 1986:33; Emy and
Hughes 1988:339;Parker and Nethercote, 1996;Mulgan, 1998:3;Podger,
2004:9-10). In order to facilitate the analysis, there is a need to develop
an analytical framework that distinguishes a politically controlled
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The issue of political control of the public service is usually addressed
with the idea of a politicised public service. Politicisation in the context
of the public service tends to have a variety of meanings and there is a
tendency to regard all political activities of public servants as part of a
politicisation process (Curnow, 1989:17-21; Parker, 1989:384-385;
Weller, 1989:369-370;Mulgan, 1998:3; Haidar and Pullin, 2004:1-3).
Weller (1989) argues that politicisation of the public service does not
occur when public servants express their opinion, or even when they
take political action as part of their trade union activity. Nor is
politicisation simply the reverse of neutrality (Weller 1989). Weller
(1989:370-371) maintains that public servants have the right to be
politically active as long as their personal preferences do not overrule
government policy or jeopardise the impartiality of the public service.
Furthermore, Weller's (1989:371) standpoint is that politicisation
becomes possible when the public service is used for party purposes
and where there is party political influence in the appointment and
promotion of public servants. Public servants appointed under this
type of employment arrangement are unlikely to enjoy security of
tenure and may be dismissed at the pleasure of politicians. It is also
unlikely that a public servant would be successful in challenging
decisions of politicians with regard to their employment matters.
Politically Independent Public Service Employment
Relationship
Under a politically independent employment relationship, employment
related matters such as recruitment and promotion decisions of public
servants are based on merit. They also enjoy legislative protection
against arbitrary decisions on their employment matters by their
employers (Hughes, 1988:177). Employment related matters of public
servants are managed by politically independent agencies variously
called public service boards and public service commissions (Spann,
1973:386). Under this employment arrangement, public service
constitutes a career where people enter the public service at a young
age and have worked their way up to become the heads of department
with regular promotions (Hughes, 1998:177).
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The chief issue then in assessing the impact of particular values or
proposals upon the politicisation of public service employment is in
determining a number of factors: one, whether these promote the direct
involvement and control by politicians over key aspects of public
servants' employment; or two: whether they upheld the politically
independent tradition wherein politicians are distanced from the
employment of public servants and direct control is exercised by an
independent public service agency. Other important factors
determining the presence of a politicisation of the employment
arrangements are the elements of appointment on merit, tenure, a
career public service, and most important of all is the management of
the employment aspects of public servants by an agency that is
independent of the control of politicians.
The framework for analysis of the 1976 Coombs Commission Report
(RCAGA, 1976) implications for the politicisation of the employment
relationship of public servants consists of two elements: firstly, whether
the recommendations espoused in the RCAGA Report promoted an
independent public service agency or rather direct control of the
employment of public servants by politicians; and secondly, whether
the principles of appointment on merit, tenure and a career public
service were challenged.'
BACKGROUND TO THE COOMBS REPORT
In December 1972, the Australian Labour Party (ALP) gained office for
the first time in twenty-three years. The new government was
committed to a broad reform agenda and it was in a hurry (Weller and
Smith, 1977:7). In June 1974, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam
announced the establishment of the Royal Commission on Australian
Government Administration (the Coombs Commission) (RCAGA,
1976). It was the first independent and wide-ranging inquiry since the
review undertaken by Commissioner Duncan McLachlan in 1918-19,
and its terms of reference required it to examine most aspects of the
public service and other agencies of administration (Weller and Smith,
1977:5).
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Although proposals for an inquiry into the public service had
emerged in the 1950's and the last years of the Liberal-Country Party
Government 1970-72, they had not received adequate support to
proceed (Weller and Smith, 1977:9). A number of factors can be seen to
have contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with the public service,
all of which culminated in the establishment of the RCAGA in 1974,
including the expansion of the public service during and since the war
years, the long period of conservative government rule, the
inexperience of the Whitlam government Ministers and the policies as
well as attitudes of government departments and senior public servants
(Weller and Smith, 1977: 7-10).
Whilst the Australian public service expanded and upgraded its
services during the War years, the expansion of the State and the
changes in the nature of its activities reached their fastest pace in the
period after World War II when 'the universal franchise was for the
first time combined with almost universal secondary education, higher
incomes and adequate non-work time to organise' (Wilenski, 1986:16).
The expansion of government functions was, in part, the expression of
the slowly changing balance of power as newly organised groups in
society, including women, gays and migrants, learnt to use democratic
processes to fight for their rights (Wilenski, 1986:17). As government
operations became more complex and technical, very few ministers had
the time, knowledge and requisite skills to comment with confidence
on this expanded range of administrative and policy matters (Wilenski,
1986:212-3). In June 1974, at the time the Coombs Commission was
established, there were 146300 people employed in the Australian
public service spread over twenty-seven departments and a number of
specialist bureaux and statutory commissions (Weller and Smith,
1977:6).
Issues of ministerial control and political neutrality of public
servants did not appear to be of much concern during the long period
of conservative Liberal-Country Party rule when change was slow and
measured, although there had been periodic but unsuccessful
proposals for an inquiry into the public service during the 1950's and in
the last years of the Liberal-Country Party Government (Weller and
Smith, 1977:8-9). However, the perceived political neutrality of the
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public service became more difficult to sustain in the context of a shift
of power in society to newly organised interests groups, where many
Labour Ministers in the Whitlam government questioned the political
neutrality of senior public servants who had served one government
for a long time (Weller and Smith, 1977:8; Pullin and Haidar, 2003:2).
By the 1970s, the policy advice and interpretation of the public interest
by senior public servants was arguably 'limited by their background
and experience ... it was in its senior reaches, male, white, Anglo-Saxon,
predominantly Protestant and middle-class in its origins - a highly
political group with strong views on major policy issues ... with a
tendency towards the status quo and moving forward with caution'
(Wilenski,1986:120).
The public service was not accustomed to the pace and pressure of
the Whitlam government's demands, and even those public servants
who were open and welcoming to the new government were fearful
that proper procedures were being ignored, changes were being
introduced without adequate analysis of their implications and that
many proposals were expensive and wasteful (Weller and Smith,
1977:7-9). Major changes in the structure of government departments
and in policy areas, particularly related to the Treasury, were needed to
accommodate the Whitlam government change proposals as ministers
were frustrated by what they saw as lack of public service co-operation
(Weller and Smith, 1977:8-9).
Against this background of significant ministerial frustration and
concern with the Australian public service, the Whitlam government
established the RCAGA with very broad terms of reference, and
appointed five Commissioners of whom, Dr H.C. Coombs, one of
Australia's most distinguished public servants, was appointed
Chairman of the Commission (RCAGA, 1976:19; Weller and Smith
1977:10-12). The terms of reference specified in the Letters Patent were
very broad and required the Commission to examine all structures and
procedures of government administration. It was to pay attention to a
list of twelve subjects that included many with possible employment
relations implications, such as (d) responsibility and accountability of
public servants, as well as a number topics specifically related to
employment relations including (i) personnel policies and practices
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(RCAGA, 1976: Letters Patent). In Weller and Smith's (1977:13)
analysis of the conduct of the RCAGA, it was argued that the
government's concern with industrial relations issues was also evident
in the appointment as Commissioners of Dr Isaac, a former industrial
relations university professor, and Paul Munro, Secretary of the
combined council of the public service white collar unions.
In November 1975, the Whitlam government was dismissed by the
Governor General and a month later, a Liberal National-Country Party
government, led by Malcolm Fraser, was elected which was dedicated
to reducing public expenditure, stopping the expansion of the public
service and accepting the traditional role of the public service. The
RCAGA was instructed to report by 30 June 1976 (Weller and Smith,
1977:24-5). Its final Report was released on 1 August 1976, although it
was undated (RCAGA, 1976;MacDonald, 1977:65).
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RCAGA
The RCAGA conducted a very broad ranging inquiry. It received over
750 written submissions from members of the public on matters related
to the terms of reference. More than 150 government agencies and 500
community and business organisations were invited by letter to make
submissions. The Australian Council of Social Service was also invited
to encourage members of the community to express their views. The
Commission conducted meetings with parliamentarians, public
servants, members of the business community and academics. The
inquiry included a program of visits to work places and an extensive
research program. The Report was presented in three parts. Part A set
out the approach of the Commission and outlined the way in which
Australian government administration related to Australian society
and government. It identified and assessed the major criticisms of
public administration. Part B reported on the major issues of particular
concern to the Commission and were explored in great detail. Part C
concerned achieving change, and included a summary of the
recommendations and suggestions regarding implementation. The
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Report was accompanied by four supplementary volumes containing
supporting material.
The RCAGA (1976:51.3.3, 7) concluded from its inquiry that
Australian government administration was in need of 'significant
adaptation to deal responsibly, effectively and efficiently with the tasks
which confront it. The Report recommended far-reaching changes to
public administration structures and processes (Briggs, 2005:2).
However, it did not propose a 'wholly different system of
administration nor a wholly different set of relationships within it'
(RCAGA, 1976:51.3.4, 8; RCAGA, 1977:176). Rather, the Report sought
to focus on changes which were thought to be justifiable, practicable
and compatible with continued effective operation and, in particular,
those changes which would promote responsiveness and adaptation
(RCAGA, 1976:51.3.4,8;RCAGA, 1977:176). Hawker (1981) argued that
the Commission was concerned with how to translate political desires
into intelligible administrative commands, and how to put those
commands efficiently into practice but the 'gravest deficiency of the
report was its inability to carry through the principles of accountability
to the public into specific proposals for institutional change' (Hawker
1981:157).
The major areas of concern to the Commission were outlined in Part
A of the Report and concerned the inefficient use of resources,
insufficient responsiveness to the needs of ministers, a lack of
responsiveness to community desires and employment practices which
led to inefficiency, inequity and low morale (Hamilton and Hamilton,
1976:304; RCAGA, 1976; RCAGA, 1977:176). A persistent theme of the
Report which underpins many of its recommendations is the need for
adaptability and for the administration 'to be aware of and responsive
to the facts of social change' (RCAGA, 1977:176). The Report's three
key and enduring themes concerned increased responsiveness,
improved efficiency and effectiveness and greater community
participation (Colebatch, 2002; Briggs, 2005:2).
To identify whether the RCAGA either actively promoted a
politicisation of Australian public service employment relations, or
perhaps more discretely laid the ideological or policy basis for such
politicisation to occur at a later date, the actual Recommendations of
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the Commission will be examined as well as associated discussion and
commentary. The key issues to be evaluated are firstly, whether the
RCAGA sought to diminish or replace the role of the independent
public service agency and increase direct control by politicians in the
employment arrangements of public servants; secondly, whether the
RCAGA sought to alter or abolish the principles of appointment on
merit, tenure and a career public service. Therefore, the implications of
the RCAGA for the politicisation of the employment of public servants
will be assessed by examining their recommendations and expressed
values concerning the role of an independent public service agency,
and those employment conditions seen to underpin an independent
public service concerning appointment on merit, tenure and a career
public service. The Commission's views and recommendations
concerning the employment arrangements relating to departmental
heads will then be examined in a separate section of this article,
mirroring the Commission's consideration of the employment
conditions of departmental heads somewhat independently of their
consideration of public service employment generally. Finally, the
RCAGA's views concerning ministerial offices and statutory authorities
will be briefly examined because those areas of public administration
have been subject to concerns regarding politicisation in recent years.
THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC SERVICE
AGENCY
Within the Westminster model of responsible government, the exercise
of direct control over the employment of public servants by an
independent public service agency lies at the heart of an independent
public service. In Australia, certainly at the time of the Coombs
Commission, the independent public service agency which controlled
the employment of public servants was the Public Service Board (PSB).
No-where in the Report is it recommended or even canvassed that the
Board should be abolished or have its powers transferred to elected
members of parliament. Nor did the Commission support ideas 'ideas
earlier mooted on such matters' as 'splitting the Public Service Board'
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or 'avoiding any form of central establishment and classification
control' (MacDonald, 1977:68). However, the Report does include
discussion and several recommendations concerning changes to the
functions of the PSBwhich be seen to have laid the basis, in the form of
an idea or suggested policy, for a future politicisation of the
employment of public servants.
The Commission was concerned with the location of responsibility
and accountability. It argued that ministers are frequently less skilled
in administration than heads of departments, leading sometimes to the
domination by department heads of both administrative and policy
processes and less effective political authority (RCAGA, 1976:S3.4.4,
43). The Commission received a number of complaints about the
administration as an employer: procedures were seen as cumbersome
and outmoded; organisational structures as excessively rigid; control
by the PSB as over-detailed and stifling of initiative; recruitment and
selection procedures as biased; opportunities for career development as
unnecessarily limited (RCAGA, 1976:S2.3.16, 18). The RCAGA also
received a number of submissions proposing the transfer of the
recruitment function from the PSB to departments and agencies based
upon criticisms of the Board's responsiveness to departmental needs
(RCAGA 1976:S8.2.39,179).
In its Report, the Commission expressed the view that whilst they
believed there was some validity in the criticisms, they did not believe
that these outweighed the need for the PSB to bear responsibility for
the maintenance of quality generally in the staffing of the Service, nor
did they regard the centralisation of this responsibility with the PSB as
incompatible with greater delegation to departments and agencies
(1976:S8.2.40, 179). It recommended that the PSB should delegate to
departments the power of recruitment more extensively, including
lateral recruitment but that the Board should set the standards and
monitor the procedures (1976:RI27-128, S8.2.40-44). The then Secretary
of the PSB, Bruce MacDonald, argued that these recommendations
were consistent with the Board's efforts to develop processes which
would give departments 'greater flexibility to manage establishments
within a system of controls' (MacDonald, 1977:72).
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The Commission sought to increase ministerial control of
departmental activity and improve efficiency by giving managers
greater control over resources and making them accountable for the
results (RCAGA, 1976:53.4.6, 43; Nethercote, 1977:106). It was
recommended that greater departmental autonomy be accompanied by
the introduction of 'a regular program of efficiency audits in which
departmental performance be assessed. These assessments should be
so designed that they would bring before ministers, cabinet and
Parliament both the assessment itself and the data on which it is based'
(RCAGA 1976:53.6.1,46). The Commission noted that the P5B was
empowered under Section 17 of the Public Service Act to conduct
periodic examinations of departments but asserted that the auditing
and assessing of performance had not adequately taken place (RCAGA,
1976:53.6.4-3.6.7, 46-7). It recommended that the role of Auditor-
General be extended to undertake the assessment of departmental
performance (RCAGA, 1976:R7,53.6.17,49).
It is argued in this article that whether the RCAGA promoted a
politicisation of Australian public service employment relations can be
assessed in terms of whether it sought to diminish or replace the role of
the independent public service agency and increase direct control by
politicians in the employment of public servants. Although the
Commission did not challenge the central role of the P5B in its control
of the employment of public servants, it did shift some control and
accountability from the Board to departmental managers, including the
power of recruitment, albeit within the constraints of standards and
monitoring procedures established by the P5B. The Commission also
recommended that the responsibility for auditing and assessing
departmental performance be removed from the Board and given to the
Auditor-General. These changes were designed to ensure that
'departmental heads are to be accountable to ministers and Cabinet for
the efficiency with which they manage their departments' (RCAGA,
1976:53.4.8,44).
Although the recommendations of the RCAGA concerning the role
of the independent public service agency, the P5B, were clearly not
aimed at increasing direct political control over the employment of
public servants, by shifting some areas of control from the Board to
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Parliament, departmental managers and to the Auditor-General; they
may have laid a foundation for the future politicisation of public
service employment relations. Nethercote may have foreseen such a
possibility when he concluded that Mr Harold Macmillan once
quipped that 'when one piece is moved in the delicate design of an
administration, corresponding reactions follow, down to the humblest
pawn'. The Commission's report recognised the interlocking nature of
its own recommendations. It remains to be seen whether this will be
reflected in their implementation' (Nethercote, 1977:116).
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS OF PUBLIC SERVICE
Three aspects of the employment conditions of public servants have
defined the politically independent public service employment
relationship: appointment on merit, tenure and a career public service.
The RCAGA did not seriously challenge these aspects of public sector
employment, but it did recommend changes aimed at ensuring greater
community representation within the ranks of the public service and at
encouraging a public service more attuned to community needs.
The Commission was of the view that the 'quality of administration
is a function of the quality of the people who undertake it. No system
of administrative structures and procedures can perform at its best
unless it recruits and retains appropriately skilled and motivated men
and women (RCAGA, 1976:58.1, 165; Bailey, 1977:41). The Commission
expressed throughout its Report strong values and recommendations
concerning the need to ensure the representation of disadvantaged
groups within the public service. Coombs clarified the values of the
Commission in stating that:
'The composition of the bureaucracy... reflects not the structure of
Australian Society as a whole but that of the already privileged sections
within it. It is not easy to achieve a more representative balance while
preserving the measures of 'merit' which underlie the system' (Coombs,
1977:50).
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The Commission stated clearly that it upheld the concept of
recruitment by merit and did not question or challenge the role of the
P5B with respect to 'appointment and recruitment' (RCAGA,
1976:58.2.5 -5 8.2.6, 171). However, it was concerned that there were
problems with the application of the merit principle and was not
satisfied that the tests used provided the soundest or fairest basis for
recruitment (RCAGA, 1976: 58.2, 170-2; Bailey, 1977: 41). The
Commission proposed a charter for the P5B, placing it under a duty to
ensure that in the recruitment, appointment, promotion, and transfer of
staff there is no discrimination on grounds unrelated to the needs of the
work to which the appointment, promotions or transfer is made and
that special measures are taken to secure adequate advancement of
members of disadvantaged groups (RCAGA, 1976:R334,511.6.46, 401).
The Commission supported the retention of a career public service
but concluded that 'certain characteristics of the 'career service' enabled
the administration to function to some extent as a self-contained elite
group', without being sufficiently accountable, and argued that efforts
were required to ensure that the administration reflect the social
composition of the community, and to facilitate the free movement into
and out of the administration in order to promote responsiveness to
social change (RCAGA, 1976:52.5.1.7, 27; Bailey, 1977:45). The
Commission concluded that the 'career service' sometimes resulted in
people staying in their jobs although they were dissatisfied and in there
being too little mobility of staff into and out of the service (Bailey,
1977:42). The Commission recommended that a system of staff
exchanges or secondments be developed to facilitate greater mobility
within the service and between government and other spheres of
activity (RCAGA, 1976:R94, 56.3, 145; Bailey, 1977:43). The
Commission also expressed concern regarding excessive attachment to
formal educational qualifications and a rigid system of classification of
position and work (RCAGA, 1976:58.2.46-54and 59.2.3, 181-4 and 255).
It recommended devolution of responsibility to department heads and
a greater flexibility in the administration of the classification system
(RCAGA, 1976:R202,59.2.3 and 59.2.15, 245-7).
It must be concluded that although the RCAGA did recommend
changes to certain aspects of the employment conditions of public
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servants, it did not recommend against appointment on merit, tenure
and a career public service. With respect to these three aspects of the
employment conditions of public servants that have defined the
traditional Westminster system of government, the RCAGA did not
promote direct political control in the employment arrangements of
public servants generally. The Commission did, however, make
specific recommendations concerning the employment of departmental
heads, and these will now be reviewed to ascertain their implications, if
any, for the politicisation of the employment relationship.
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP OF DEPARTMENTAL
HEADS
Peter Bailey, who had been a Commissioner for RCAGA and at the
time of writing was Secretary in the Department of Minister and
Cabinet, asserted that 'few aspects of our inquiry attracted as much
attention as the role and responsibilities of departmental heads' (Bailey,
1977:31). The Commission was required to consider 'how power over
and responsibility for departments should be divided between
ministers and department heads' (RCAGA, 1976:54.5.1, 95). Issues in
debate included the focus of the permanent head's responsibility,
ministerial access to the department except to the extent and in the
form agreed by the permanent head, the nature of the permanent
head's obligations to other sources of authority within the
administration including the cabinet and the duties imposed upon him
by the Audit Act and the Public Service Act (RCAGA, 1976:54.5, 95-8;
Bailey 1977:31-3). Of central relevance to the issue of political control
over the employment of public servants, the RCAGA Report discussed
and made recommendations concerning the appointment of
departmental heads and the issue of their tenure (1976:R49-55, 54.5.8-
23, 98-103).
The potential for direct political control over the employment of
departmental heads was affirmed in legislation before the Coombs
Inquiry. As noted in the RCAGA Report, Section 54 of the Public
Service Act 'while envisaging that appointments might be made on the
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recommendation of the PSB, provides alternatively that they may be
made by the 'Governor-General without reference to the Board'. In
practice, the minister and the Prime Minister in most cases consult the
Board, and recommendations receive Cabinet approval before being
submitted to the Governor-General' (RCAGA, 1976:54.5.8,98).
Although the values and recommendations expressed by the
Commission erred on the side of upholding the traditional
characteristics of an independent public service, and did not
recommend greater direct political control of the employment of
departmental heads, it also did not propose a winding back of the then
already existent provisions for direct cabinet appointment via the
Governor General. The RCAGA did, however, advocate a process of
consultation with the chairman of the PSB which would culminate in
the collective approval of Cabinet (RCAGA 1976: R49, 54.5.9, 98). A
reading of this section of the RCAGA Report leaves the reader with a
feeling that the Commission was itself somewhat uncomfortable with
its own recommendation; that it was perhaps reluctantly submitting to
the political reality of direct political appointments. 'It is most probable
that, as in the past, the majority of appointments to positions of head of
a department will be made from within the Service. However the
position of departmental head should not be 'closed', although we
would be disappointed if the career service did not produce the best
candidates in the majority of instances' (1976:54.5.10,99).
A similar disquiet is observable in the RCAGA discussion and
recommendations concerning the tenure of departmental heads. The
Commission noted that following the changes of government in 1972
and 1975, a large number of departmental heads were displaced or
relocated but that they did not lose their positions in the public service
but rather became an 'unattached officer(s)' (1976:54.5.12, 99). It was
argued that there were deficiencies in the extremes of the views
submitted to the inquiry - that the departmental head should be
assured 'permanence' or that he should be removed 'at pleasure'
(1976:54.5.15, 100). The Commission argued against fixed term
appointments for departmental heads but recommended that they not
remain in one department for longer than seven years but be relocated
(1976:R51, 54.5.17, 101). It was recommended that a process be
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followed by a minister wishing to change his departmental head, and
that a departmental head's tenure of office should not be coterminous
with the life of the government under which he was appointed
(1976:S4.5.19,101).
The RCAGA also recommended that 'the office of departmental
head be made statutory, governed by terms and conditions of
appointment specific to it which would provide that a departmental
head be appointed by the Governor-General' and that a person
appointed from outside the Service would have no statutory right to be
employed in the Public Service (1976:R53, 54.5.20-21, 102). Although
the RCAGA was not promoting direct political control over the
appointment of departmental heads, its views and recommendation
certainly accepted the existence of such political control and may be
viewed as having laid the foundation for further politicisation by
recommending the transfer of employment control from the PSB to the
Governor-General who might be seen to be more directly subject to
Cabinet submissions than the Board.
MINISTERIAL OFFICES AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
The RCAGA's views and recommendations regarding ministerial
offices and statutory authorities are of interest because these aspects of
public administration have been subject to criticisms of politicisation in
recent years. The argument, put Simply, is that the appointment of
ministerial staff and heads of statutory authorities is made by ministers
and Cabinet and therefore subject to direct political control.
The Commission noted the expansion in ministerial offices
following the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 and the
appointment of individuals from both within and outside the public
service 'at a more senior level than had previously been the norm'
(RCAGA, 1976:54.6.1, 103). A view submitted to the Commission was
that 'the advisor role was a temporary phenomenon, associated with
the advent of a Labour government after a long period in opposition,
and that over time ministerial offices would tend to revert to the purely
facilitative role' (RCAGA, 1976:54.6.1, 104). The Commission asserted
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that it was 'not insensitive to the need of ministers for better staff
resources' and argued 'that it can best be met by raising the level and
status of the private secretary' (RCAGA, 1976:54.6.5, 105). The
Commission also argued that it should 'be possible to staff minister's
offices so as to meet the minister's requirements', that 'the grading of
ministerial private secretaries be made sufficiently wide ... r and 'that
such advisors, even if appointed for a limited term should be integrated
with the staff of the department' (RCAGA 1976:54.6.6, 105). Once again
in its Report, the Commission appears torn between its desire to
uphold the values of an independent public service and the political
reality that government has already grown its directly controlled
ministerial offices. The Commission's response to the vexing issues of
ministerial offices was to avoid the potential implications for
independent advice and ministerial responsibility.
With respect to the staffing of statutory authorities, the Coombs
Commission was more decisively in favour of staffing under the Public
Service Act. The Commission identified in its inquiries thirty-four
statutory authorities which were not governed by the Public Service Act
but under the terms of their establishment had some kind of statutory
relationship with the Board and a further forty-six authorities staffed
independently of the Board (RCAGA, 1976: 58.1.5, 166). The
Commission found that 'statutory provisions concerning the staffing of
statutory authorities appear to be untidy and reveal no consistent
principle as to when it is appropriate for staff to be employed under the
Public Service Act' (RCAGA, 1976:59.4.10, 257). It was recommended
'that there should be a presumption in favour of staffing statutory
bodies under a Public Service Act' (RCAGA, 1976:R214,59.4.14, 258).
Therefore, on the issues of ministerial offices and the staffing of
statutory authorities, the RCAGA may be seen to have expressed some
concern over the issue of political control and the by-passing of the
independent agency but it stopped short of opposing these. Colbatch
has also noted that the RCAGA did not address the use of contracting-
out or outsourcing (2002:96).
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CONCLUSIONS
Many commentators have argued that the RCAGA Report (1976) has
significantly influenced public sector reform in Australia for the past
three decades (Colebatch, 2002; Podger, 2004; Briggs, 2005). Similarly,
many recent commentators have expressed concern regarding the
politicisation of the Australian public service (Mulgan, 1998:3;Hawkes,
1999:80; Nethcrcote, 2003). However, contemporary research has not
investigated the role played by the Coombs Inquiry in perhaps paving
the way for such politicisation. One of the reasons for this of course is
that the RCAGA Report (1976) became somewhat lost in history as the
Whitlam government, which established it, was no longer in power at
the time its findings were presented.
This article examined the position taken by the RCAGA report
concerning the political control of the employment arrangements of
Australian public servants. In assessing the nature and potential
impact of the RCAGA Report upon the politicisation of the public
service, attention was directed to whether these promoted a politically
controlled public service or whether they upheld the tradition of a
politically independent public service.
It has been argued that the RCAGA Report supported the key
elements of a politically independent public service. The RCAGA was
found to support the control by the independent agency, the PSB, over
the employment arrangements and the maintenance of appointment on
merit, a career service and tenure. Although these key elements of an
independent public service were supported, the Commission argued
for modifications to these elements in line with its commitment to
improved efficiency, accountability and responsiveness both to
ministers and to the community. Whilst the proposed changes did not
amount to direct support for political control over the public service,
they may have laid the basis for future politicisation. In particular, by
recommending some shift in control from the PSB to departments and
to the Auditor-General as well as the statutory appointment of
departmental heads, the RCAGA may have opened the way for some
diminution in the role of the independent agency in the employment of
public servants, and an increased direct political control.
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The RCAGA, despite its strong support for those elements of an
independent public service, also accepted those aspects of government
administration already evidencing signs of politicisation. The
RCAGA's discussion and arguments suggest that they were not
entirely comfortable with their treatment of these issues. They appear
to have accepted somewhat reluctantly, with a sense of inevitability,
direct ministerial appointments under Section 54 of the Public Service
Act, in ministerial offices and in statutory authorities.
In conclusion, the RCAGA overtly supported an independent public
service agency exercising control over the employment of public
servants but it accepted those elements of direct political control
already present in some areas of employment within the public
administration. Furthermore, some of its recommendations supported
changes to traditional public sector employment arrangements which
are consistent with those latter introduced and which may be seen to
have contributed to a politicisation of the Australian public service.
These issues must be considered in their historical context. The
Whitlam Labour government was committed to profound social change
yet it inherited a public service that had served Liberal governments for
twenty-three years. The government felt some degree of frustration
regarding the degree of support it received from the public service.
The focus of the Coombs Inquiry was on the administration of
government within this context of desired change, and concerns
regarding the principles of the Westminster system of government
were not paramount, although it is clear that the Inquiry did not seek to
fundamentally alter the nature of its foundations in Australia.
This analysis of the RCAGA recommendations is potentially of
considerable significance to any analysis of contemporary public sector
politicisation. It also demonstrates the importance of adopting an
historical approach to analysing social changes. Although some may
be uncomfortable the idea, the research findings presented in this
article suggest that the roots of the future politicisation of the
Australian public service, evident and widely commented upon in the
early years of the twenty first century, can be located in the report of
the Coombs Commission (RCAGA, 1976).
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NOTES
I It is recognised that these elements do not fully capture the ways in which the
employment relationship of public servants can be politicised. The proposed
model only recognises a small number of the elements of the employment
relationship which were those identified by Northcote and Trevelyan over 150
years ago. Sadly, it is apparent from a comprehensive review and
understanding of the literature, that the key elements of the employment
relationship have not been adequately defined in the literature.
Whilst definitions of the relationship have been developed from various
disciplinary perspectives, a comprehensive definition which might be applied
in our current research is not available. The reason for this absence may well
lie in the separation of disciplines. While some have sought to define industrial
relations and others have provided definitions of employment relations, their
focus has been upon the study of the subject and what should be included in
such a study rather than upon the core elements of the relationship (Gardner
and Palmer, 1992; Deery, Plowman et al, 2001; De Cieri and Kramar, 2003).
Only in the discipline of law, driven by the necessity to provide definition to
the 'new' non-slave class of workers, does a concise explanation of what
constitutes an employment relationship exist. Yet even this definition, based
upon the notion of 'control' is seriously bereft even in the purely legal sense
(Mills, 1982). A comprehensive definition of the employment relationship,
built upon the theoretical insights from various disciples, would greatly assist
our endeavours to understand phenomena such as the politicisation of the
employment relationship.
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